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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
compliance with the CPLR should yield to the court's fundamental
sense of fairness. 55
CPLR 320: The appearing nonresident - Everitt revisited.
In Everitt v. Everitt5" an action was commenced against a nondo-
miciliary by serving her while she was temporarily within the state. The
summons was accompanied by a notice stating that the action was being
brought for breach of contract and that judgment would be taken in
the amount of $46,900 in the event of default. 57 After defendant had
entered an appearance in the action, she was served with a complaint
containing an additional cause of action for libel demanding damages
of $350,000. Reasoning that the default notice was rendered ineffective
by the defendant's appearance, a majority of the Court of Appeals per-
mitted the libel cause of action to stand despite defendant's assertion
that the court lacked personal jurisdiction to adjudicate that claim.
An appearance without timely objection to jurisdiction confers
full in personam jurisdiction over the defendant 58 in most instances. 59
Nonetheless, it has been maintained that fundamental due process
objections are raised by Everitt inasmuch as the defendant had not ap-
peared in the action to defend a $350,000 claim for libel and, conceiv-
ably, she would have elected to default had she been aware of the enor-
mity of the plaintiff's additional claim.60 Accordingly, it has been
concluded that when a defendant does enter an appearance, it should
not be viewed as a "submission to a free-wheeling form of in personam
jurisdiction on any and all causes of action by any and all parties to the
action.""1 Moreover, it could be posited that the plaintiff in Everitt em-
ployed the $46,000 contract action with the attendant risk to defendant
of absolute liability via default as a lever for securing jurisdiction in the
much larger libel action. Similar considerations were deemed to out-
weigh the interests of the plaintiff and the court in resolving all issues
in one action where the plaintiff has secured jurisdiction by attaching
property owned by a nonresident.62 Possibly, an expansive reading of
55 See Belofatto v. Marsen Realty Corp., 62 Misc. 2d 922, 310 N.Y.S.2d 191 (N.Y.C. Civ.
Ct. N.Y. County 1970), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 342, 350
(1970).
56 4 N.Y.2d 13, 148 N.E.2d 891, 171 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1958).
57 See CPLR §§ 305 & 3215(e).
58 CPLR 320(b).
59 Two exceptions are the limited appearance under CPLR 320(c) and the restricted
appearance under CPLR 320(b).
6o Everitt v. Everitt, 4 N.Y.2d 13, 18, 148 N.E.2d 891, 894, 171 N.Y.S.2d 836, 840 (1958)
(dissenting opinion). But see 3 WK&M 3025.10.
61 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 320, supp. commentary at 244 (1970).
62 See FIFTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE STATE OF NEW
YoRK A109-113 (1970).
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recent cases will lead to a judicially created limited appearance in cases
resembling Everitt. 3
First National City Bank v. Elsky64 pronounces a rule designed to
protect the defaulting defendant. There, plaintiff moved to increase the
amount demanded in his complaint against a defendant who failed to
appear in the action. Notice of said motion was served by mail, i.e., in a
manner authorized for service of interlocutory papers under CPLR
2103. Plaintiff attempted to justify this mode of service by pointing to
CPLR 2103(c) which permits service by mail upon a party who has not
appeared by an attorney. Nonetheless, the court ruled that "a person
who has not appeared at all is not synonymous with a person who has
not appeared by an attorney." 65
Essentially, the court distinguished the case at hand from one
where the defendant has entered an appearance and then defaulted. So
long as the amended complaint is served before the defendant in the
latter situation defaults, plaintiff is entitled to avail himself of the pro-
visions for service of interlocutory papers. Where, however, the defen-
dant has not appeared in the action, the notice of motion for leave to
amend the complaint must be served in the same manner as a sum-
mons.66 Such method of service, noted the court, is necessary to insure
that defendant is fully aware of the consequences of his default.
Of course, if the jurisdictional basis for the original cause of action
was the service of a nonresident within the state, more would be re-
quired than compliance with the notice requirements found in CPLR
308. In order to add an unrelated cause of action against the defendant,
plaintiff would also be required to demonstrate a separate jurisdictional
predicate. This much was conceded by all of the members of the Everitt
Court67 although the question was not squarely before them. A further
limitation on claims that may be asserted against a nonresident was pro-
nounced in In re Einstoss.68
In an earlier action to foreclose a mortgage on land owned by de-
fendant in the territory of Alaska, service was effected by delivering the
summons personally to the defendant in the state of Washington. Inas-
63 It could be speculated further that an ad hoc approach to limited appearances
would lead to legislative action. CPLR 320(c) which prescribes a limited appearance in
attachment cases was enacted to terminate the judge-made law that was emerging in cases
such as Tjepkema v. Kenney, 31 App. Div. 2d 908, 298 N.Y.S.2d 175 (1st Dep't 1969). 1
WK&M 320.18a.
64 62 Misc. 2d 880, 312 N.Y.S.2d 325 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1970).
65 Id. at 883, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 329.
66 See 7B MVICKINNEY'S CPLR 3215(b), commentary 10, at 869 (1970).
674 N.Y.2d at 16, 17, 148 N.E.2d at 892, 894, 171 N.Y.S.2d at 838, 839.
68 26 N.Y.2d 181, 257 N.E.2d 627, 209 N.Y.S.2d 184 (1970).
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much as the defendant was not subject to personal jurisdiction in
Alaska, plaintiff agreed to satisfy any judgment solely out of the mort-
gaged property if defendant appeared in the action. Nevertheless, the
territory of Alaska, which had been joined as a defendant, asserted a
cross-claim against defendant on an unrelated cause of action. Before
the expiration of time in which to answer the cross-claim, defendant
died. The action proceeded to judgment in favor of Alaska against de-
fendant for $95,000. The instant proceeding was commenced against
defendant's administrator to recover the unpaid portion of the judg-
ment.
The Court of Appeals proffered two reasons for denying full faith
and credit to the Alaskan judgment: the New York administrator had
not been made a party to the proceedings after defendant's death and
the Alaskan court never acquired personal jurisdiction over the dece-
dent on the unrelated cross-claim.
With regard to the first ground, the Court noted that under the
federal rules,69 as under the CPLR,70 an action must be dismissed when
a defendant has died before a verdict or decision is rendered, unless the
action is revived by substituting the personal representative. Plaintiff
contended that the failure to substitute the administrator was merely a
formal defect which did not divest the court of jurisdiction; the Court
of Appeals replied that substitution was imperative inasmuch as juris-
diction over the decedent did not secure the requisite jurisdiction over
his administrator.71
In any event, the Court did not believe that the Alaskan court ever
acquired jurisdiction over the decedent with respect to the cross-claim.
Apparently, the Court was addressing itself to a question which has re-
ceived little attention heretofore: must a defendant demonstrate an in-
dependent jurisdictional basis for his cross-claim? The Court's answer
in the affirmative will have a profound effect on the course of litigation
where a defendant has made either a limited appearance or a restricted
appearance in New York.
It would seem that the question has not generated much discus-
69 FFD. R. Civ. P. 25.
70 See CPLR 1015(a).
71 The Court stated that with the advent of the long-arm statute, jurisdiction over
the decedent would provide jurisdiction over the administrator provided that the latter
was afforded sufficient notice of the action. In re Einstoss, 26 N.Y.2d 181, 191, 257 N.E.2d
637, 642, 309 N.Y.S.2d 184, 191 (1970), citing Rosenfeld v. Hotel Corp. of America, 20
N.Y.2d 25, 228 N.E.2d 374, 281 N.Y.S.2d 308 (1967). Whether this statement is true regard-
ing a nondomiciliary whose only contact with the state is the fact that he was served here,
has been questioned by Professor McLaughlin. See 7B McKINN.Y'S CPLR 302, supp. com-
mentary at 126 (1968).
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sion because in the ordinary case the defendant confers the requisite
jurisdiction on the court by appearing in the action. Bides v. Abraham
& Straus, Inc32 illustrates the outer limits of this point. In Bides defen-
dant moved successfully to dismiss the plaintiff's action on the ground
that the court lacked personal jurisdiction. However, in its answer to a
cross-claim asserted by a codefendant, defendant failed to reallege its
jurisdictional objection. Hence, the curious result ensued whereby de-
fendant was deemed no longer a party to the action by the plaintiff but
very much a party to the defendant's cross-claim.
Will Einstoss lead to a judge-made limited appearance in the Ev-
eritt situation? An affirmative response is perhaps attributable to a
strong opposition to the Everitt outcome. Or, perhaps it reflects an ac-
quiescence in the observation that with the emergence of a minimum
contacts theory of jurisdiction the wholly fortuitous act of catching a
nonresident within the state should no longer serve as a jurisdictional
predicate. 73 Nevertheless, it is possible that in the future Einstoss will
be read conservatively and distinguished by focusing on the fact that
the administrator was not made a party to the Alaskan action. It is sub-
mitted, however, that it is an excellent time for, at least, restricting the
adversary's right to amend against unwary nonresidents to claims based
on the same occurrence or transaction that underlies the initial cause of
action.74
ARcLE 10-PARTiEs GENERALLY
CPLR 1005: Use of class action continues to be restricted by the courts.
In this age of consumerism, there has been an increased awareness
not only of the plight of the consumer but also of the availability of
many legal devices to aid in the effort to remedy that plight. One such
device is the class action prescribed in GPLR 1005.71 While advantages
to the plaintiff utilizing the class action include those of an economic
and procedural nature, imagine the profound impact upon public
opinion, the jury, and the opposing party when there exists a class of
1,000 plaintiffs suing for $500 each, instead of a single plaintiff prosecut-
72 33 App. Div. 2d 569, 305 N.Y.S.2d 336 (2d Dep't 1969); see also Wajtman v. Brook-
lyn E. Dist. Terminal, 276 App. Div. 853, 93 N.Y.S.2d 586 (2d Dep't 1949).7 3 See Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth
and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956).
74 Cf. Frumer & Graziano, Jurisdictional Dilemma of the Nonresident Defendant in
New York-A Proposed Solution, 19 FoRaHAmr L. REv. 125, 142-43 (1950).
75 For a comprehensive survey of the use of the class action in consumer suits, see
Starts, The Consumer Class Action -Part I: Considerations of Equity, 49 BosrON L. REv.
211 (1969); Starts, The Consumer Class Action -Part II: Considerations of Procedure, 49
BOSTON L. REv. 407 (1969).
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